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ABSTRACT
The current literature on politicization can be separated into three groups:
politicization within national political systems, of the EU, and of international
institutions. In spite of speaking about a similar phenomenon based on a
common definition, these three strands of literature do not interact with each
other and display, beyond the definitional consensus, significant differences.
The focus on different political levels also leads to various assessments. This
contribution compares these three strands of literature with the goal of
showing that it is necessary to simultaneously look at all three levels to
understand the dynamics of politicization and de-politicization. There is a
significant potential of analyzing different (de-)politicization processes in an
integrative framework to provide fresh insights for each of the fields. In fact,
some of the differences between the three kinds of literature can be resolved
only by looking at the three levels in parallel.
KEYWORDS Politicization; multilevel politics; integration; technocratic governance; cleavage
The concept of politicization has made a steep career since the early 2000s. It
is an important issue in the current study of European integration, indicating
that the European politics has moved from a permissive consensus to
constraining dissensus with an increased role for identity politics. The
politicization of international institutions both by leftist anti-globalization
movements as exemplified by the Battle of Seattle – the 1999 World Trade
Organization (WTO) protests – and by the right-wing populist challenge to
the transferal of authority to international organizations (IOs) is well studied.
On the domestic level, the rise of right-wing populist parties can be seen as
a response to a period of de-politicization in liberal democracies.
In all of these debates, the term ‘politicization’ has been defined in a similar
way. Politicization, in the most general terms, means the demand for, or the
act of, transporting an issue or an institution into the sphere of politics –
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making previously unpolitical matters political. This core of the concept is
common to different conceptions represented in the three kinds of literature.
Politicization, therefore, can be generally defined as moving something into
the realm of public choice, thus presupposing the possibility to make col-
lectively binding decisions on that matter. In most political systems, a col-
lective choice about an issue is based on a prior process of putting the
issue on the agenda, some deliberation about the right decision, and the
interaction of different positions regarding the choice. The more salient
the issue, the more actors and people participate in the debate, the
more positions are polarized, and the more politicized a decision or insti-
tution is. While different strands of the literature use different operational
definitions, there seems to be a common core meaning of the concept
of politicization.
In spite of speaking about a similar phenomenon based on a common
definition and pointing to fundamental transformations, these three strands
of literature do not interact with each other but display, beyond the defini-
tional consensus, significant differences. To begin with the obvious, they
talk about different political levels. The focus on different political levels
also leads tendentially to varying assessments. Whereas European Union
(EU) studies in general terms mainly ask about the disintegrative effects of
politicization – thus questioning earlier hopes in politicization (Haas 1964;
Schmitter 1969) – the study of de-politicization in the national context and
of politicization of international institutions more often emphasizes the nor-
matively positive aspects of increased mobilization. Whereas the international
relations (IR) literature sees the politicization of international institutions
mainly as a function of the rise of international authority, most students of
EU politicization and re-politicization in the domestic context see it as part
and parcel of a changing conflict constellation within the member states.
While work about de-politicization in the domestic context sees growing
mobilization as a response to de-politicization, EU studies and IR scholars
see ‘their’ politicization as a very recent process without antecedents.
In the remainder of this contribution, I want to systematically compare
these three strands of literature with the goal of showing that it is necessary
to simultaneously look at all three levels to understand the dynamics of poli-
ticization and de-politicization. I will argue that a perspective that takes the
interaction effects between the three different levels into account will help
to produce different or at least more nuanced findings about politicization
processes. It will lead to richer assessments of the overall level of politicization
and help to better understand the dynamics of de-politicization and re-politi-
cization, also allowing for a more sophisticated understanding of the conse-
quences of politicization.
In the next section, I systematically compare analyses on the three levels
along a set of common themes and concepts. Against this background, I
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emphasize in the second section the potential of analyzing different (de-)poli-
ticization processes in an integrative framework to provide fresh insights for
each of the fields. In fact, some of the differences between the three kinds
of literature can be resolved only by looking at the three levels in parallel.
Three levels of politicization research
The main distinction between the three kinds of literature refers to different
political levels. Drawing this distinction does not mean naturalizing these
levels. It rather takes up three different discourses that have evolved separ-
ately (with fluid borders) since each of them addresses different politicization
processes. In each of the three, different decision-making bodies located on
different political levels are studied.1 It is for this reason that the three kinds
of literature look at somewhat different behaviors and changes, use
different indicators for the study of politicization, and point to partially
different causes of politicization. It seems therefore worthwhile to dig
deeper and to look at each of the three levels in more detail.
The national level: politicization in comparative politics
For a long time, politicization necessarily meant politicization of domestic
politics. With the centralization of political authority in the nineteenth
century, people in Western Europe were expected to address the national pol-
itical institutions when they had political demands. In comparative politics,
the study of politicization was always part of the field – without always
using the term itself. The analysis of the decline in voter turnout, party mem-
bership, and traditional political mobilization in the 1960s thus implicitly
referred to processes of de-politicization. The trend toward de-politicization
began in the 1960s. Two towering political science figures captured this
trend early on. Otto Kirchheimer (1965) coined the term ‘catch-all party’ as
part of an investigation into political party transformation in Britain and
Germany. A catch-all party is a political party that aims to attract people
with diverse political viewpoints, appealing to broad segments of the electo-
rate, and centralizing decision-making power. Catch-all parties thus reduce
polarization and the number of actors involved in decisions. Robert Dahl
sketched the adverse consequences of catch-all parties. In his view, these
parties come with the
politics of compromise, adjustment, negotiation, bargaining; a politics carried on
among professional and quasi-professional leaders who constitute only a small
part of the total citizen body; a politics that reflects a commitment to the virtues
of pragmatism, moderation and incremental change; a politics that is un-ideo-
logical and even anti-ideological. (Dahl 1965: 21–2)
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In addition to the rise of catch-all parties, the rise of neo-corporatism and
cartel parties contributed to de-politicization. Neo-corporatism favored econ-
omic tripartism, which involved strong labor unions, employers’ unions, and
governments as ‘social partners’ to negotiate and manage a national
economy (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). Cartel parties use the resources
of the state to maintain their position and prevent the rise of alternative
parties (Katz and Mair 1995). Last but not least, the growing role of non-major-
itarian institutions fostered the tendency towards moderation and compro-
mises (see also section 2). Independent central banks became more
important all over the world, becoming more autonomous at the same time
(Rapaport et al. 2009). Similarly, constitutional courts increased in importance
in many countries (Hirschl 2005). In general, according to a quantitative study,
‘autonomous regulatory agencies’ play a role in 73% of all policy areas in the
countries under investigation (Jordana et al. 2011).
These developments for quite some time induced a more or less positive
reading. The decline in political participation, evidenced in the average
member country of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) by a steady fall in voter turnout and a marked decrease in
party membership since the 1960s (Norris 1998), was mainly seen as an indi-
cation of de-alignment, that is, the erosion of the socio-structural foundation
of political interests and preferences. De-alignment was considered as a sign
of a grown-up democracy in which political competition was dominated by
issues instead of cleavages (Dalton 1984; Sundquist 2011).
Another reading set in much later and was much more critical. In this view,
the rise of catch-all parties, cartel parties, non-majoritarian institutions, and
neo-corporatism set in train an alienation between parties and representa-
tives on the one hand and among people on the other. In this view, low
voter turnout was not a sign of deep satisfaction with the political system,
but was accompanied by low confidence in party politicians and parliaments.
In this way, the rise of catch-all parties caused the decline in traditional political
participation (Mair 2013). It is above all the work of Colin Crouch (2004) and
Chantal Mouffe (2005), who brought these studies into the realm of political
theory and gave them a broader meaning. On this basis, it was Colin Hay
(2007) who explicitly connected them to the concept of politicization. These
influential studies shifted the focus from demand-side explanations of declining
political mobilization – such as less social capital (Putnam 2000), over-critical
citizens (Norris 1999), and decreased voters’ age – (Franklin 2004) to the
supply side, pointing to the effects of globalization and remote decision
making. At the same time, they already indicated a change in the trend since
signs of re-politicization on the national level were emerging: the establishment
of new parties, especially the first right-wing populist parties in Austria, France,
and Switzerland (e.g., Betz 1994); social movements resisting potentially
destructive technologies (Beck 1993); increasing polarization in American
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politics (DiMaggio et al. 1996); and more recently a renewed increase in voter
turnout. One of the major proponents of de-alignment theory, Russell Dalton
(2018), speaks in his most recent book about re-alignment instead.
While the early research asked about the causes of the decline in political
participation in Western democracies, the later research asked about what
follows after the decline of the class conflict and the consequences for democ-
racy. Since it is increasingly acknowledged that we do not see a simple decline
in the level of politicization, but rather a restructuration of the political land-
scape, research is again more or less explicitly informed by cleavage theory
(Bartolini and Mair 2007; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In this view, a social revolu-
tion creates packages of conflicts that pit two structurally defined groups
against each other. It is then the taming of the class conflict and the
decline of the working class that leads to de-politicization in the first place.
In the second place, however, the emergence of a new cleavage caused by
changes in the value systems of affluent societies (Inglehart 1990) and globa-
lization (Kriesi et al. 2006) leads to new forms of politicization and polarization
(Zürn 2018b).
The perspective on ‘the political’ is rather comprehensive. While there is a
focus on parties and voter turnout as well as (in the US case) on congressional
voting, the study of cleavages has broadened, and it also includes social
movement and public debates (de Wilde et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012).
There is an interest in the overall level of political participation and mobiliz-
ation, and thus in looking at different forms of political behavior. Moreover,
the focus is on the (democratic) use of political institutions. Most of the
approaches in comparative politics focus on political participation in demo-
cratic states and consider both participation and conflict lines indicated by
this participation as a necessary ingredient of democratic politics. To be
sure, the rise of populist parties, especially of right-wing populism, is not wel-
comed by many, as well as being considered a danger for liberal democracies
(Müller 2016). At the same time, it is viewed by others as a means to express
dissatisfaction within the system and as a mechanism that may help to close
representational gaps (Merkel and Ritzi 2017).
The major hypothesis explaining the dynamics of de-politicization and re-
politicization refers to a fundamental change in the cleavage structure that
can be observed in most modern societies. The taming of the class conflict
has produced the rise of a second cleavage between the winners and losers
of globalization. As a result, a two-dimensional political landscape has
emerged in which the decline of politicization along the class cleavage is com-
pensated along the globalization cleavage between integrationists and
demarcationists (Kriesi et al. 2012) or between cosmopolitans and communi-
tarians (de Wilde et al. 2019).2 In this view, democratic political systems need
to adjust to the new landscape with changed party systems and some insti-
tutional adaptations. It is, however, considered to be a change within
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democratic systems, which only by inappropriate responses may lead to a sys-
temic challenge. New parties and new institutions are needed to close rep-
resentational deficits and allow for new coalition building.
The European level: politicization in EU studies
Functionalist integration theory had already been interested in the topic of
politicization (Schmitter 1969). The renewed academic interest in the role of
politicization in the European integration process started about ten years
ago. While the first three decades of the EU were seen as a welfare-enhancing
process based on economic interests, the broadening of the integration
process into non-economic issue areas led to the rise of identity politics,
which entangled European integration in a growing conflict between elites
and masses: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus (Hooghe
and Marks 2009).
As opposed to the re-politicization of domestic politics, the politicization of
the EU was not preceded by a de-politicization of European politics. In spite of
moments of political salience, the EU institutions worked smoothly and
silently most of the time. While some academics complained about the demo-
cratic deficit in the EU and asked for the institutional prerequisites to allow for
Europe-wide public debates and political competition on the EU level (e.g.,
Follesdal and Hix 2006; Habermas 2007, 2011; Hix 2008; Risse 2010; Zürn
2000), the permissive consensus was seen by most as part of the success of
the EU. Interestingly, most of the early deviating voices were primarily not
EU experts but they brought in perspectives from Political Theory (e.g., Haber-
mas), Comparative Politics (e.g., Hix), or IR (e.g., Risse). The majority of Eur-
opeanists argued differently. Especially major EU theorists like
Giandomenico Majone (1994, 1996) and Andrew Moravcsik (2004, 2006)
emphasized the pareto-optimizal and apolitical character of the EU as its
central feature. In this view, the EU as regulatory state focuses neither on dis-
tributive nor on salient issues, but it manages efficiency and coordination pro-
blems. Any democratization of this process, therefore, is considered as
counter-productive.
Politicization was observed only when the Constitutional Treaty was
rejected in referendums in the Netherlands and France. This rejection
brought into the open that support for further integration cannot be taken
as given. The permissive consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) in Euro-
pean societies that gave space to European governments to pursue the path
of deepening integration dissolved and was replaced by a constraining dis-
sensus. It is this constraining dissensus that lies at the core of a postfunction-
alist theory of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Remarkably, both the
term of permissive consensus until the early 1990s and the shift towards Euro-
scepticism afterward are hardly contested anymore. In the words of Philippe
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Schmitter (2009: 211–2), ‘[n]o serious student of European integration can
deny that something like politicization has occurred since the mid-1980s’.
Related to the rise of constraining dissensus was the observation of U-
shaped support for European integration. While the EU still has firm support
from mainstream political parties and their voters, it is more the extreme
parties on the right and the left as well as their supporters who are Euroscep-
tical. This U-shape reflects a growing divide between elites and the broader
public regarding the EU, with the elites strongly in support (Hobolt 2009;
Hooghe 2003; Teney and Helbling 2014). It is this socio-structural difference
in support of the EU project that anchors most explanations of politicization.
The primary hypothesis about this shift was the notion of a growing rel-
evance of identity politics. Accordingly, the de-emphasis on the economic
benefits of European integration was accompanied by a growing emphasis
on national considerations regarding culture and self-determination. To the
extent that the EU has moved beyond the economic integration project, it
has caused identity politics and with it the politicization of European inte-
gration. Right-wing populist challengers and Eurosceptic political forces
‘smelt blood’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 21). Hutter et al. (2016), however,
point out that conflicts between and within mainstream parties may also
nurture the politicization of the EU, of which Brexit may be seen as the
most important instance.
In general, there are significant parallels between the more encompassing
cleavage analysis and the politicization of the EU (see Hutter et al. 2016; Marks
and Steenbergen 2004). The growing conflicts about European integration are
then a constituent of a broader cleavage between demarcationists and inte-
grationists with the EU as an object of contention among others. In most
cases, this derives from a conflict between cosmopolitan-minded elites and
more communitarian-minded publics, but the conflict can also be utilized in
the competition between and within mainstream parties. Two differences
to the study of re-politicization on the national level are noteworthy. First,
the mainly positive connotation associated with politicization in the domestic
context is much more contested in the EU context. The politicization of the EU
is seen especially by post-functionalist theory as a problem and a danger for
the integration process. In line with the reasoning of Majone (1996) and Mor-
avcsik (2006), the shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus
puts shackles on the executive decision makers, thus preventing compromises
on the European level. The result is a decline in problem-solving capacity and
the entry towards a vicious cycle of declining effectiveness and support
(Hooghe and Marks 2009).
While many EU scholars considered politicization as a problem and hin-
drance for further integration, others emphasize the possibility of overcoming
the democratic deficit. In these contributions, the apolitical and non-redistri-
butive character of the EU was questioned (Follesdal and Hix 2006). Moreover,
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politicization was considered as a necessary social condition for the develop-
ment of institutional procedures that allowed for more democracy and politi-
cal competition within the European institutions (Beck 2006; Rauh and Zürn
2014; Risse 2010; Sabel and Zeitlin 2010; Zürn 2006). In this view, democrati-
zation is considered as a necessary prerequisite of further European inte-
gration, and the rise of politicization, therefore, offers a political
opportunity. It has been empirically shown that a high level of politicization
of EU decision making can actually improve the responsiveness of suprana-
tional institutions (Rauh 2016). However, much of research on EU considers
politicization a problem. It is not a resource utilized as part of regular politics,
but – to put it bluntly – an anti-systemic force. Only very recent research
openly tests the possible consequences of EU politicization (Bes et al. 2018).
Second, the politicization of the EU is mostly studied by looking at indi-
cators that play out on the national level. In the words of Edgar Grande and
Swen Hutter (2016: 29), their ‘analysis focuses on the domestic level because
the national level is still considered the central arena for political mobilisation
and national governments are still the most relevant actors in key decisions on
European integration’. The rise of Eurosceptic parties, the growing divide
between elite and masses, and public debates are the indicators that are ana-
lyzed to understand the politicization of European institutions better (see, e.g.,
contributions to de Wilde et al. 2016). This is different from the study of poli-
ticization in the domestic context, where the indicators utilized to study the
phenomenon are on the same level as the institutions and decisions that
are politicized.
In sum, politicization is viewed by European studies as a response to a too
far-reaching European integration – either beyond the economic realm
(Hooghe and Marks 2009) or too much European authority (de Wilde and
Zürn 2012) – that would endanger or even halt this process. Therefore, the
majority of Europeanists see politicization as something problematic that
may lead to the decline of the EU.
The global level: the politicization of international institutions
Whereas the politicization of episodes of foreign policy has a long history, the
politicization of international institutions has a comparatively short one. The
public debates preceding each of the two World Wars, the Vietnam War, or
the German Ostpolitik – to name a few – are all instances in which ‘foreign
policy’ strategy and decisions gravitated to the center of the political
debate. World politics, therefore, has been at the center of political debates
in certain instances for a long time. To the contrary, the politicization of inter-
national institutions is a relatively new phenomenon. The anti-apartheid and
third world movements in the 1970s can be considered predecessors of
current developments, but the broad politicization of international
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institutional policies and procedures with electoral effects was largely absent
at that time. In contrast, the politicization of inter- and transnational insti-
tutions points to a process through which widening arrays of actors – such
as individual citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), parties,
lobby groups, and governmental bodies – are oriented towards international
institutions.
The Battle of Seattle is a crucial event for the study of politicization on the
global level. This led to rich research about the study of protests that is
cognate to the concept of politicization. This work – originated by scholars
like Donatella della Porta, Dieter Rucht, and Sidney Tarrow – has shown
that there are many indications for an ongoing transnationalization of social
protests (Della Porta 2007; Della Porta and Caiani 2009; Gronau et al. 2009;
Pianta and Zola 2005; Rucht 2013; Tarrow 2001, 2005). Moreover, Della
Porta and Tarrow (2012) see transnational movements that target inter-
national institutions as the latest and most important move in the transnatio-
nalization of social protests. Indeed, Della Porta (2011) uses the concept of
politicization to grasp these developments (see also Nullmeier et al. 2010;
Steffek and Hahn 2010).
In IR, the concept of politicization of inter- and transnational institutions
was introduced shortly after the Battle of Seattle (Zürn 2004). It was associated
with the authority transfer hypothesis from the beginning. According to this
hypothesis, the politicization of inter- and transnational institutional insti-
tutions including the EU grew, because they exercise more authority and
have become more intrusive from the 1990s onwards. This has produced
legitimation problems and made it possible to move formerly barely visible
institutions into the spotlight of political contestation (Zürn et al. 2007). The
hypothesis received support in quantitative studies of public media (Rauh
and Boedeker 2016; Rixen and Zangl 2013; Schmidtke 2014), as well as in
qualitative studies on political mobilization and political attitudes (Binder
2013; Viola 2013; Zürn et al. 2012). In general, research on the politicization
of inter- and transnational institutions is less developed than that on the poli-
ticization of the EU. There are fewer studies and less quantitative data avail-
able. Nevertheless, the global level is an elementary component of
politicization in a multi-level governance world. Moreover, the study of politi-
cization on the global level provides a distinctive take.
First, the authority transfer hypothesis emphasizes the interplay and nor-
mality of de-politicization and re-politicization dynamics. To the extent that
the relative importance of different political levels changes, political attention
changes accordingly. Any lobbyist with a limited amount of resources needs
to ask which political institutions on which political level they need to address
to achieve their goals. To the extent that, for instance, the WTO becomes more
relevant than national tariff policies, we see a transfer of political authority
and, with it, a shift of attention on the side of the rational lobbyist. In this
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sense, the study of politicization on the global level has highlighted the auth-
ority–legitimation link, according to which any authority attempts to arouse
and foster legitimacy beliefs by legitimating the exercise of authority (Zürn
2018a: chap 3). Second, the study of politicization of inter- and transnational
institutions, therefore, looked at both aspects of politicization at the same
time: the authority-challenging, anti-systemic protests against international
institutions mainly by nationalist forces as well as the mere utilization of inter-
national institutions with the goal to change policies. To the latter category
belong such diverse groups as the lobbyist mentioned above, transnational
movements with an anti-neoliberal program, such as the Association for the
Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizens’ Action (ATTAC), or ecologi-
cally-minded NGOs like Greenpeace. In all these cases of utilization of inter-
and transnational institutions, the goal is to change policies. Only part of
the current politicization of international institutions thus comes in the form
of resistance against global governance institutions. Many transnational
non-state actors publicly address international institutions in a positive way,
for instance, by calling for drastic intensification of governance measures at
the international level. Public resistance to international institutions and
their more intensive utilization are both expressions of the process that is
referred to as politicization. Therefore, the politicization of inter- and transna-
tional institutions were studied both on the level of global politics and as
reflected in national political systems.
Finally, the focus on the authority transfer hypothesis points to the under-
lying question about the changes of political mobilization in a global govern-
ance system that includes the interaction between different levels.
Politicization is therefore seen as an enabling condition that can lead to demo-
cratization and deepening of the global political level – a necessary but not
sufficient condition for democratization. At the same time, politicization may
contain the seeds of the decline of global governance (Zürn 2018a).
These explorations into three kinds of literature about politicization can be
illustrated in the Table 1, which summaries them on the basis of six issues that
have also structured the reviews. This summary aims at highlighting differ-
ences and therefore neglects nuances that are discussed in the text.
The plea for an integrated perspective as a new avenue of
politicization research
The three reviews have shown that (de-)politicization takes place and is
studied on all political levels, but that the three kinds of literature are not
well-connected with each other. The concept is used on all three levels, and
arguably all the major conceptions used on the different levels are expressions
of a common core concept even if their operationalization differs due to
context. Therefore, it comes as a surprise that the interactions among them
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are not far developed. Against this background, I want to conclude by point-
ing out that the majority of the most relevant questions in the study of poli-
ticization can be answered only if a more integrative perspective is taken.3 I
would like to underline this claim by pointing to three major issues of politi-
cization research referring to the degree of politicization, its social origins, and
its consequences.
To start with, the level of politicization and contestation cannot be assessed
by looking at the three levels only separately. If someone who believed in the
liberal ideal and the need to establish political structures of non-discrimi-
nation lived in the early 1960s, there would have been very good reasons
for that person to become a member of a national left-leaning liberal party.
If a person with similar political beliefs becomes politically interested five
decades later, it may be much more plausible for them to work with
Amnesty International. In any case, the choice of one or the other is not a
sign of ‘more’ or ‘less’ politicization. A focus on only one political level in
the study of politicization runs the danger of overlooking counter-trends on
the other political levels. It is therefore that the much-regretted decline in pol-
itical participation in the domestic context was partially accompanied by
increased engagement on the European and international levels. What
might have looked, in the first place, like de-politicization may turn out as a
scale shift in political participation. It is therefore necessary to take a perspec-
tive that encompasses all three levels.
With such a perspective in mind, there are good reasons to argue that the
overall level of politicization has increased in recent years – at the latest when
Table 1. Three kinds of politicization literature.
Comparative politics EU studies International relations
Origin and
empirical
research
Decline of participation;
later right-wing populism
and the new political
landscape
Rejection of
Constitutional
Treaty; U-shaped
support for EU
Battle of Seattle; nationalist
rejection of international
institutions
The operational
components
The aggregate degree of
political mobilization
EU institutions and
policies as discussed
in national political
systems
Transnational movements
as well as international
institutions as reflected in
national and transnational
debates
Resistance or
utilization
Utilization (use of political
system to get new
policies)
Resistance (against EU) Rejection and utilization of
IOs
Major question After class cleavage? Identity politics? Contested authority?
Major hypotheses End of catch-all parties; new
party landscape
Identity issues
becoming more
relevant
Authority transfer
hypothesis
On consequences
and evaluation
Representational deficits
and coalition building
Negative (constraining
dissensus)
Enabling politicization;
creates a critical juncture
for either decline or
deepening of global
governance
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the de-politicization trend on the national level reversed. One hypothesis for
the integrated study of politicization, therefore, is that the overall level of poli-
ticization and contestation grows over time if activities on different political
levels are taken into account (Zürn 2014: 64).
In addition, it seems important to analyze and understand the relationship
of politicization among the three different political levels. Arguably, the devel-
opment of politicization on one level is affected by politicization on other
levels. It can also be expected that the specific form of this relationship
depends on scope conditions. While the relationship may have been substitu-
tive during the last decades – indicating a zero-sum relationship between the
degrees of politicization on different levels – in times of crisis and of extraordi-
narily high levels of politicization, it may be a mutually reinforcing one. Cur-
rently, it looks like the politicization of the EU and international institutions
translates into further accentuation of the new cleavage domestically.
Second, taking the three processes together points to a general dynamic of
de-politicization and re-politicization. De-politicization on all three levels is a
response to moving consequential political decisions away from majoritarian
institutions such as national parties and parliaments to non-majoritarian insti-
tutions such as central banks, constitutional courts, and IOs.
Since the nineteenth century, democratic political systems have been con-
sidered those in which parliaments – in connection with parties and govern-
ment – play the decisive role. Parliaments are prototypical majoritarian
institutions; they decide via majority by elected representatives. The represen-
tatives are elected on the basis of a competition between parties. Parliaments
and parties thus are majoritarian institutions that embody the idea of popular
sovereignty. Non-majoritarian institutions, like courts and central banks, have
always played an important role in democratic political systems as well. Non-
majoritarian institutions can be defined as governance entities ‘that (a)
possess and exercise some grant of specialized public authority, separate
from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the
people, nor directly managed by elected officials’ (Thatcher and Stone
Sweet 2002: 2). In democratic theory, one of their major tasks is to control
and limit the public’s powers so they do not violate individual and minority
rights, and thus do not undermine the democratic process (Elster 1994;
Holmes 1994). In addition, they implement the norms set by the legislature
(see Ackerman 2000). International institutions are also non-majoritarian insti-
tutions since they intrude into majoritarian politics based on similar, mostly
technocratic justifications (see Keohane et al. 2009). In this conception of
democratic rule, parliaments are the norm setters, while non-majoritarian
institutions play a limiting role.
With this distinction in mind, it can be argued that recent decades have
seen a reversal in the relationship between majoritarian and non-majoritarian
institutions. Many non-majoritarian institutions became norm setters.
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Increasingly, non-majoritarian institutions not only provided a check on and
implemented decisions of majoritarian institutions, but were key in policy
making and norm setting. This is also true for a dense network of international
arrangements and organizations that differ in both quality and quantity from
traditional international institutions. The new international arrangements
exercise authority over their constituent members and, at the same time,
intervene profoundly in the internal affairs of countries, undermining the con-
sensus principle of international politics and national sovereignty. This rise of
international authority also transforms the role of government along the
majoritarian–non-majoritarian axis. Since governments are elected, they
have traditionally been seen as majoritarian institutions. To the extent,
however, that the more powerful Western governments control international
authorities, they can use international institutions to circumvent parliaments
and party members. In fact, the rise of multi-level governance systems, includ-
ing all the new space created for blame-shifting and credit-claiming, detaches
the executive from the legislature and makes government a significant player
in the world of non-majoritarian institutions. The rise of international insti-
tutions empowers the executive and weakens parliaments.
Overall, some domestic institutions within democracies, as well as inter-
national institutions, became more powerful relative to parliaments and
parties in the last three decades. These non-majoritarian institutions not
only implement and control policies – as foreseen by the notion of democratic
constitutionalism – but they have also become strongly involved in setting
norms and rules. In this sense, the last decade has witnessed a de-politiciza-
tion by moving consequential decisions to non-majoritarian institutions.
As a response, we can see a re-politicization on all three political levels. On
the domestic level, political contention and party politics is back. At the same
time, European and international institutions are brought back into the politi-
cal realm to the extent that their decisions are no longer accepted as admin-
istrative acts with technocratic justification or considered to be without
alternative. In this way, the three movements towards re-politicization
belong together and are directed against a period of de-politicization in
which many decisions were moved towards non-majoritarian institutions.
To find out whether there is close interaction between de-politicization and
re-politicization, and to understand the role of multi-level politics in this
context, it is necessary to take an integrated perspective.
Third, it is also necessary to look at the interactions between the national,
the European, and the international levels to fully grasp the consequences of
de-politicization and re-politicization. Arguably, the politicization of politics on
all levels feeds the rise of a new social cleavage that plays out not only in party
systems in Western Europe but also on different political levels in similar ways
(de Wilde et al. 2019). According to cleavage theory, cleavages are triggered
by social revolutions that create socio-structural divisions. In the case of the
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new cleavage, the underlying social revolution is globalization, and one can
expect that the winners of globalization are pitted against the losers. The
new cleavage is, therefore, one between cosmopolitans and communitarians.
In ideational terms, cosmopolitanism stands for a political ideology that advo-
cates open borders and a transfer of public authority to the global level and
that prioritizes the protection of individual and minority rights. Communitar-
ians, on the other hand, emphasize the constitutive role of communities
and identities for the development of social attitudes. In their view, both
distributional justice and democracy depend on social contexts that most
often are territorially delimited. They emphasize democratic self-determi-
nation and are much less in favor of international institutions and regional
integration processes than are cosmopolitans. Finally, communitarians
reject the notion of universal values and tend to subsume individual
rights under the majority culture. The main actors of the cosmopolitan
coalition include mainstream political parties, state agents in the govern-
ment, the judiciary, and the liberal media. The communitarian camp is
dominated by authoritarian populists who advocate national protectionism
on economic issues and anti-globalization, but also receive increasing
support from some factions in leftist parties and the traditional circles in
conservative parties.
If we conceive this new cleavage as a struggle about borders that plays out
on all levels of multi-level governance, the need to look at interactions
between different levels becomes obvious. While cosmopolitan positions
use international institutions to predominate, communitarian positions are
often restricted to national arenas. Whereas cosmopolitans can use the Euro-
pean and the international level to influence domestic decisions, communitar-
ians put forward a de-proceduralized notion of the national will, often against
individual rights and international obligations. Grasping these strategic inter-
actions between levels is necessary to understand the dynamics of de-politi-
cization and re-politicization. There is, therefore, a significant benefit of
studying politicization on different levels as part of a general de-politicization
and re-politicization dynamic in a broadly conceived global multi-level gov-
ernance system.
Notes
1. In distinguishing the national, European, and international level, the local level
gets incorporated in the national one. It would be a separate but quite interest-
ing question why there is much less work on the politicization of local politics.
2. We have chosen cosmopolitanism and communitarianism – terms with roots in
recognized and respected political–philosophical traditions – in order to empha-
size that current conflicts may not be temporary ones between modern and ata-
vistic factions in society, but a much more permanent cleavage inspired by two
opposing political ideologies.
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3. Of course, this does not exclude the fact that, to find answers for particular ques-
tions, one needs to focus on the politicization on a specific level.
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